What the data says
In the three months after the war began, the Defense Department committed money to seven major contractors at about 2.4 times its usual rate.
$106.9B went to Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, L3Harris and Palantir in March–July 2026, 1.8× the average for the same months of 2024 and 2025. The surge was in March–May.
It wasn't a rising tide. Every other DoD contractor combined grew 10%; these seven grew 91%, and their share of DoD contract money went from 27% to 39%.
$38.3B was on foreign arms sales, double prior years, and that drove the rush of contracts signed before prices were agreed. None of it is officially tagged to the war, and Congress has passed no war funding law. A law from before the war, which added $79.0B for weapons and ships, may explain part of the rise.
Contract money to seven defense companies nearly doubled
1.8× the usual amount. $106.9B in March–July 2026, against an average of $59.3B in the same months of 2024 and 2025.
This is money committed to contracts, not money paid out or profit earned.
The surge came in the first three months, then faded
2.4× in March–May. March to May ran at 2.4× the usual level. By July it was 1.0× — back to normal.
The timing lines up with the war, but other things happened in those months too (see the last card).
It wasn't a rising tide: these seven took a bigger share
39% of all DoD contract money. Every other DoD contractor combined grew 10% compared with 2025. These seven grew 91%. Their share went from 27% to 39%.
This shows where the money went, not why it went there.
Foreign arms sales through these companies doubled, and drove the rush
$38.3B in foreign arms sales. Contract actions that include Foreign Military Sales funds (weapons the US buys on behalf of other countries) reached $38.3B, against $18.0B in 2025. Of the $30.8B that went out before prices were agreed, $21.0B was on these foreign-sales contracts.
The records don't say which countries are buying, and some foreign sales are paid for with US military aid. Naming the buyers needs another source.
For most of the foreign arms money, the government doesn't say who's buying
92% of foreign-sales money with no buyer named. The Defense Department's daily contract announcements name a buyer for $2.9B of the $38.3B: Kuwait ($1.0B), Taiwan ($439.4M), Saudi Arabia ($99.9M), Poland ($30.8M), South Korea ($30.8M) and others. The largest unnamed purchase is Lockheed Martin's award for Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles: $4.5B in foreign military sales funds, with no country named. Congress had been notified of PAC-3 sales to Denmark, Germany, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates before that award, so they are possible buyers; the record does not say which, if any.
Announcements cover actions over $7.5 million only. Arms-sale notices to Congress name approved buyers, but never a contract, so they cannot say who paid for a specific award.
Since the war began, Gulf states were approved to buy missile-defense weapons on a large scale
$44.2B Gulf missile-defense sales approved since the war began. Arms-sale notices sent to Congress since February 28 include Patriot, PAC-3 or THAAD systems for Kuwait ($19.4B), United Arab Emirates ($18.2B), Qatar ($4.0B) and Bahrain ($2.6B), all paid with their own national funds.
These are approvals to sell, not signed purchases, and none names a contract. Values cover each whole sale, which can include support items. They don't show where any weapons were used.
Guided-missile purchases were 2.5× their usual level
$27.1B on guided missiles. The largest single contract was Lockheed Martin's $4.8B award for Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles. Missiles for the US's own use rose too: $13.9B, against $5.3B in 2025.
Ships, engines and aircraft grew a lot as well. This is not only about missiles.
The orders are piling up: backlogs jumped, led by Lockheed Martin
+51% Lockheed Martin's order backlog in nine months. Lockheed Martin's signed-but-undelivered work went from $193.6B at the end of 2025 to $292.0B by late September, against 2% growth over the same months a year earlier. RTX's grew 27% (+15% a year earlier); Northrop Grumman's grew 15% (0% a year earlier). Revenue rose only 5–11%, because backlog turns into revenue over years.
Filings don't say which orders relate to the war, and RTX's backlog includes commercial aerospace. Backlog is money committed, not yet earned.
Insiders sold less stock than a year earlier
$43.4M in stock sold by insiders since the war began. Executives and directors of the seven companies sold $43.4M of their companies' stock on the open market between February 28 and September 30, against $55.8M in the same months of 2025. About 71% of the dollars were sold under trading plans set up in advance.
Insider sales are legal and publicly disclosed. A sale is not evidence of trading on inside information.
Lockheed Martin received the most; RTX, General Dynamics, Boeing and Palantir more than doubled
$39.9B to Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin got $22.6B in the same months of 2025. Totals include each company's subsidiaries.
Subsidiary links are as the companies report them to the government; ownership hasn't been independently verified yet.
The money surged. The lobbying didn't.
0 lobbying reports that mention Iran. The seven companies reported $55.8M in their own lobbying expenses for January–September 2026, against $53.1M a year earlier (+5%). Their filings cover missile defense and munitions at the usual rate, inside the regular defense bills. None mentions Iran, in any year. In 2026, a former staff director of the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, which writes defense funding, began lobbying for 2 of these companies (Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics) through an outside firm.
Disclosure forms list bills and broad issues, not who was met or what was said, so they can't show influence either way.
PAC money went down, but half went to the members who oversee the war
53% of PAC money to the war's overseers. The seven companies' PACs gave $4.7M to candidates and committees in March–September 2026, less than the same months of 2022 ($5.8M), the last midterm year. 53% went to current members of the committees that oversee the war and write defense money. 14 of those members took money from all seven PACs this cycle.
Company PACs give to the members who oversee their industry every cycle, within legal limits of $5,000 per election. A contribution is not evidence of anything given in return.
The House refused three times to pull forces from the Iran war, then voted to do it three times
3–3 House votes to end the Iran war: failed, then passed. Each vote directed the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran. They split almost entirely by party: 215 Republicans mostly voted to keep forces in, 216 Democrats mostly to remove them, and 4 broke ranks. 10 members switched from no to yes as the outcome flipped. The seven companies' PACs gave to both sides about equally: a median of $8,000 per Republican and $7,500 per Democrat.
With so few members breaking from their party, this data cannot show whether PAC money tracks war votes. Senate votes are not included yet.
None of it is officially labelled as war spending
0 contracts tagged to the war. 0 of 39,908 contract actions carry the code the Defense Department uses to tag spending to a named operation. No new emergency funding codes appear either. And Congress has passed no war funding law since it began.
That doesn't mean the spending is unrelated, only that the government hasn't said it is.
Budget timing doesn't explain it. A pre-war law might explain part of it.
$79.0B pre-war money for weapons and ships. The 2026 defense budget passed on February 3, 2026, so some spring spending is normal catch-up. But that lifts every contractor, and everyone else grew 10%. Another possible factor is a law from July 4, 2025 that added $29.2B for shipbuilding, $25.4B for missiles and other weapons, and $24.4B for space-based missile defense and sensors, all before the war.
Contract records don't say which law paid for which contract, so this data can't separate that money from a response to the war.
What this doesn't tell us
- Why the money was committed. Contract records say what was bought, not why.
- How much the companies earned. That needs their SEC filings (next data source).
- Whether any of this is improper. Sole-source contracts and letter contracts are routine for major weapons.
Data retrieved 2026-11-05 from primary government sources. Downloads: findings.json, board.json. Turn on JavaScript for the interactive board and every record with its source link.